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Abstract
Negotiations for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the European Union (EU) and the
United States (US) and for the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between the EU and Canada have
provoked massive mobilization throughout Europe, both on the streets and online. Yet France, long at the epicenter of
anti-globalization and anti-Americanism, has played a surprisingly modest role in the mobilization campaign against these
agreements. This article asks why France did not contribute to anti-TTIP mobilization and, more broadly, how patterns of
Frenchmobilization over trade have changed over the past two decades. Using comparative-historical analysis, we explore
to what extent this puzzling French reaction can be traced to changing attitudes towards the US, agenda-shaping by the
French government, and transformations in the venues and techniques of social mobilization. We thus contribute to the
growing literature on the politicization of trade agreements and offer insights into the links between domestic and inter-
national politics.
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1. Introduction
Over the past decade, several trade and investment
agreements negotiated by the EuropeanUnion (EU) have
drawn massive protests both on the street and on-
line, especially during negotiations for the Transatlantic
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) with the United
States (US), and the Comprehensive Economic and
Trade Agreement (CETA) with Canada. This development
has spawned scholarly interest in the politicization of
European trade policy. Some scholars have pointed to
a broader pattern of politicization in the EU, defined as
increasing polarization of opinions and public salience
(De Bruycker, 2017; de Wilde, 2011; Schimmelfennig,
Leuffen, & Rittberger, 2015). Others have focused on
explaining why trade policy became politicized after
decades of relative public obscurity (De Bièvre & Poletti,
2017; Eliasson & Garcia-Duran Huet, 2019; Laursen &
Roederer-Rynning, 2017; Young, 2017). Others yet have
emphasized variation in the degree of politicization over
time, and across agreements and countries (De Bièvre &
Poletti, 2019; Meunier & Czesana, 2019; Young, 2019).
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This article adds to this recent focus on variation in
politicization by tackling an intriguing paradox in the poli-
tics of contestation of recent trade and investment agree-
ments. The TTIP and CETA negotiations have been the
subject of massive public protests throughout the EU,
eliciting levels of contestation arguably not seen since
the 1930s (Donnan, 2016). At the height of contestation,
in 2015, more than 3.2 million Europeans had signed
the ‘STOP TTIP!’ petition aimed at pulling the EU out of
the TTIP negotiations (Euractiv, 2015). Demonstrations
in 2015 and 2016 brought hundreds of thousands into
the streets throughout the EU, with a particular concen-
tration of protesters in Germany (Deckstein, Salden, &
Schießl, 2016). Yet the voice of French protesters, tradi-
tionally one of the loudest and fiercest countries in de-
nouncing globalization, has been conspicuously absent.
How important was France in the European anti-
TTIP mobilization campaign? Why did France play such a
surprisingly modest role? This pattern of muted French
mobilization in a context of heightened contestation
in Europe is puzzling for several reasons. France has
a culture of protest. It also has a history of strong
anti-globalization mobilization, particularly in the late
1990s. Finally, France is notoriously anti-American. One
would therefore expect France to have spearheaded
anti-TTIP and anti-CETA mobilization, yet it did not. Our
aim in this article is to map out patterns of French mo-
bilization against global trade deals like TTIP and CETA,
and to develop potential explanations for these pat-
terns. Using comparative-historical analysis, we explore
this puzzle in light of prior patterns of dynamics of so-
cial mobilization, governmental strategies, and societal
anti-Americanism.
The article is structured as follows. First, we discuss
the argument of France as a leading actor in the global
mobilization against trade and investment agreements
in the 1990s—theMultilateral Agreement on Investment
(MAI) between 1995 and 1998, and the failed Seattle
Millennium Round of the World Trade Organization
(WTO) in 1999. Second, we present puzzling findings on
French public contestation on TTIP and show, through
comparative analysis, that France was ‘missing in action’
(MIA) in extra-institutional arenas of politicization, while
other countries led the contestation. Finally, we advance
a range of possible explanations, which we probe in
greater detail in a within-case analysis of TTIP politiciza-
tion in France.
2. France as the Epicenter of Anti-Globalization
Contestation: The Critical Juncture of the late 1990s
To grasp recent changing patterns of global trade politics
and the role of France in anti-globalization mobilization,
we must go back to the late 1990s, when a new, and
more constraining, multilateral trade system emerged
around the creation of the WTO. France found itself at
the center of both the shaping of this new order and
its contestation.
Two important developments took place in the
1990s. One was the deepening of the trade liberal-
ization agenda. With the Uruguay Round of negotia-
tions (1986–1994), the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade took on ‘behind the border’ trade issues (Young
& Peterson, 2006); subsequently, this new ‘deep trade’
agenda extended to a variety of economic sectors and
regulations, including services, competition policy, envi-
ronmental standards, labor rights, and investment. The
other development was the growing involvement of
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in global trade
politics. “Before the 1990s,” as Graham (2000) argues,
“the world of the environmentally oriented NGOs and
the world of international trade and investment agree-
ments were essentially disjoint. They coexisted, but they
did not touch or overlap to any significant degree” (p. 35).
This all changed in the 1990s when NGOs engaged in
the negotiations of the NAFTA (North American Free
Trade Agreement), ratified in 1993 by the US, Canada
andMexico, before shifting their focus to the global level,
where all these ‘new’ trade issues were being discussed
(Deslauriers & Kotschwar, 2003).
This new NGO activism interacted with the ‘deep
trade’ agenda during negotiations for the MAI, launched
in May 1995 under the aegis of the OECD (Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development). The
agreement aimed to provide an institutional framework
for international investment, which, unlike trade, lacked
any formal multilateral rules. The negotiations started
outside of the public glare, but very soon turned into
the first public mobilization against globalization of the
new global era. In February 1997, an early draft of
the MAI was leaked to Public Citizen, a rights advo-
cacy NGO, and published online, stirring opposition from
more than 600 organizations in almost 70 countries,
from labor groups to environmental activists (Kobrin,
1998; Walter, 2001). The opposition reflected a general
anxiety about globalization, with a particular focus on
the political power of large multinational corporations;
namely, the capacity of multinational corporations to
sue sovereign governments for democratically agreed
upon laws and policies through Investor–State Dispute
Settlement (ISDS) systems.
While opposition to theMAIwasmultinational, there
is broad acknowledgment in the literature that France
played a pivotal role in its demise (Waters, 2004). We ar-
gue that France was at the epicenter of the contestation
as a result of three key factors.
2.1. Culture at the Heart of the Contestation
Though the agreement was multifaceted and covered
a whole range of economic sectors, opposition to the
MAI focused on culture in particular. By addressing
non-discriminatory treatment for foreign investors in
all sectors, the MAI negotiations extended to cultural
goods and services—a vigorous and popular sector of
the French economy and an essential component of
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the French identity. Culture became the focal point of
French opposition, and led to mobilization of intellec-
tual and political elites across the ideological spectrum.
Philippe Seguin, head of the Rassemblement pour la
République party, claimed that integrating cultural goods
and services into the MAI negotiations “would be the
eventual death of our cinematic culture” (Tartaglione,
1998). Hervé Bourges, president of the French media
regulator (Conseil Supérieur de l’Audiovisuel), argued
that Europeans should “oppose the colonization of new
media by a lone language—English—and by a lone
inspiration—that of international groups” (Tartaglione,
1998). Both left-wing and right-wing politicians de-
nounced globalization as the death knell of French cul-
ture and demanded a carve-out for cultural industries
(Gordon & Meunier, 2001).
2.2. Traditional French Anti-Americanism
The ‘cultural exception’ met a fertile anti-American senti-
ment in France. A portion of opposition to the agreement
came from sheer nationalism. As an anti-MAI activist con-
ceded at the time:
Some of the objections [raised by the French gov-
ernment] are clearly based on nationalist grounds:
France has always had an uneasy relationshipwith the
US, and many of the objections to the measures are
simple assertions of national sovereignty versus pow-
erful, and implicitly US, economic interests. (Wood,
2000, p. 38)
TheMAIwas expected to benefit Americanmultinational
corporations more than others since the negotiating
agenda had been driven by American business lobbies
(Walter, 2001). Anti-globalization in France thus became
inextricably tied to anti-Americanism (Meunier, 2000).
Given the pervasiveness of the equation between global-
ization and Americanization in French society (Meunier,
2006), Alons and Giacalone (2014) argued that anti-
Americanism is potentiallymore powerful than any other
domestic factor in shaping French responses to globaliza-
tion because it was “less prone to wax and wane with do-
mestic political changes” than in other societies (p. 150).
2.3. Political Entrepreneurship
During the MAI negotiations French politics was
dominated by ‘cohabitation,’ or divided govern-
ment. President Jacques Chirac, of the rightwing
Rassemblement pour la République, had called for leg-
islative elections in 1997, which delivered an unexpected
victory to the Socialist Party. The new ‘Plural Left’ govern-
ment, under the leadership of socialist Prime Minister
Lionel Jospin, represented a fragile mix of Socialists,
Communists and Greens. Opposition to the MAI was
a rare point of consensus in divided French politics:
the Socialists denounced threats to labor rights, the
Communists denounced the expansion of capitalism
to all walks-of-life, the Greens denounced the dangers
to the environment posed by the agreement, while
politicians from the right denounced threats to national
sovereignty and French cultural identity.
The French government therefore catered to opposi-
tion to the MAI to cement its coalition (Graham, 2000,
p. 11). It suspended negotiations in April 1998 after im-
posing conditions that nobody expected to be met: the
exclusion of cultural goods and services from the agree-
ment, the non-extension of US law outside of US terri-
tory, special consideration for the process of European
integration, and the inclusion of environmental and so-
cial norms in the agreement. The government also com-
missioned a report that highlighted the discrepancies be-
tween technocratic and political imperatives in the nego-
tiation of the agreement, and the imbalance of the ne-
gotiations in favor of US business interests (Lalumiere &
Landau, 1998). France officially withdrew from the ne-
gotiations in October 1998, leading to their collapse in
December, and suggested a change of venue, such as the
WTO, to address investment concerns.
Opposition by the French government developed in
parallel to the ‘alter-globalization’ activism of French
movement entrepreneurs. France was a hotbed of intel-
lectual criticism of neo-liberal globalization, partly spear-
headed by a group of activists around the emerging
anti-globalization organization ATTAC (Association pour
une taxation des transactions financières pour l’aide aux
citoyens). Originating as a critique of global financial cap-
italism in the pages of theMonde Diplomatique newspa-
per, ATTAC quickly captured the attention of politicians
and citizens, prompting the French National Assembly
(Assemblée Nationale) in 2001 to support the introduc-
tion of a Tobin tax on financial transactions. ATTAC was
also the first successful alliance between the cultural sec-
tor and other segments of French society, including trade
unions and small farmers. One such farmer, the charis-
matic José Bové, was a founder of ATTAC, and of the peas-
ant union Confédération Paysanne a decade earlier.With
his Asterix-like moustache, and flair for attracting media
attention, the English-fluent sheep farmer trade union-
ist became famous in France, and beyond, after leading
the ‘dismantling’ of construction for aMcDonald’s restau-
rant in central France in 1999 (Meunier, 2000). Four years
after its creation, ATTAC had spawned forty sister orga-
nizations throughout the world. Besides being able to
deliver a strong, specific, and credible analysis of glob-
alization and its alternative (Ancelovici, 2002, p. 444),
ATTAC’s power resided in the use of transnational social
media, which enabled it to recruit and mobilize individu-
als widely (Kolb, 2005).
While anti-trade mobilization in France traditionally
revolved around farmers’ protest (Alons, 2014; Roederer-
Rynning, 2002, 2007; van der Vleuten & Alons, 2012),
after the collapse of negotiations for the MAI, and the
emergence of ATTAC, it brought together new and classic
grievances. Collectively, the inclusion of cultural goods
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on the negotiation agenda, anti-Americanism, and po-
litical entrepreneurship explain why France displayed
higher and more intense levels of anti-globalization mo-
bilization in the late 1990s. The defeat of theMAImarked
the crystallization of a broad anti-globalization camp in
France, spanning both state and non-state spheres.
3. FromMAI to MIA? Puzzling Patterns of TTIP-Related
Politicization in France and the EU
The fifteen years following the demise of theMAI in 1998,
and the aborted launch of the WTO’s Millenium Round
in Seattle in 1999, were a period of relative calm for
anti-globalization and anti-trade activism in France and
in Europe. These years were also marked by the conclu-
sion of many multilateral and bilateral trade and invest-
ment negotiations: with South Korea, Singapore, India,
ASEAN countries, and Canada. The TTIP broke that pe-
riod of relative calm. From its inception in 2013 to its sus-
pension in 2017, the TTIP met broad public contestation
on both sides of the Atlantic, but especially in Europe
(De Ville & Siles-Brügge, 2015; Young, 2017). The TTIP
had all the ingredients of a perfect storm, prone to re-
activate the triggers of French mobilization in the 1990s:
the most ambitious agenda of trade and investment ne-
gotiations in the post-Cold War era; the opportunity for
political entrepreneurs to rally a divided French public
across the political spectrum; and the US as a key party
to the negotiation, supported by its multinational com-
panies. These features make the TTIP a most-likely case
of French contention, yet opposition failed to arise.
3.1. The Indifferent French
Public opposition to the TTIP picked up pace during the
Spring of 2014, in the run-up to the elections to the
European Parliament (Buonanno, 2015; Young, 2017).
Surprisingly, Europeans were more positive towards the
TTIP than their US counterparts (Bluth, 2016), and they
remained in majority in favour of such an agreement
throughout the 2014–2016 period. However, public sup-
port in the EU as a whole clearly eroded over the period,
and there were critical national differences (Figures 1
and 2).
In all but three EU member states, Europeans by and
large favoured a free trade and investment agreement
between the EU and the US. These supportive member
states included France. An opinion poll carried out by
the French Institut CSA between 14 and 16 May 2014
showed two surprising results. First, a very large ma-
jority of respondents favoured the proposed harmoniza-
tion of production norms and standards (71%), and the
removal of tariffs and customs duties (68%; CSA, 2014,
p. 4). Secondly, the TTIP was not a very salient issue. One
year into the TTIP negotiations, the majority of respon-
dents (55%) had still not heard about them; and among
those who had, 28% admitted having only a very vague
notion of what the TTIP was (CSA, 2014, p. 4). At the
height of the TTIP public controversy, in 2015, only 1 in
5 French respondents reported following the TTIP nego-
tiations ‘closely’ or ‘very closely’—compared to 1 in 3 in
neighbouring Germany (YouGov, 2015).
Beyond these two unexpected findings, French pub-
lic opinion on the left was more sceptical, but divided.
Those close to Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s left-wing party
Front de Gauche were more markedly against the re-
moval of tariffs and customs duties: 57% were against,
compared to 55% of those who sympathized with green
movements who supported the harmonization of norms
and standards. Thus, beyond a more activist left partisan
base, the French as a whole did not appear to be very
interested or outraged.
Figure 1. Public support for a free trade and investment agreement between the EU and the US, 2014–2016 (% in favour).
Source: Eurobarometer (2014, 2015a, 2015b, 2016). Note: Eurobarometers started polling Europeans on the TTIP in the
spring 2014 (question A19.5 in Eurobarometer 82, and related numbers in the following surveys: “What is your opinion on
each of the following statements. Please tell me for each of the following statement whether you are for it or against it:
A free trade and investment agreement between the EU and the US.”)
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Figure 2. Public support for a free trade and investment agreement between the EU and the US, 2014–2016 (% against).
Source: Eurobarometer (2014, 2015a, 2015b, 2016).
This stood in stark contrast with responses in Austria,
Germany, and Luxembourg, where a public opinion
tsunami materialized against the TTIP. Germany sur-
prised observers—and itself—by the intensity of its anti-
TTIP public opposition given the country’s traditionally
pro-free trade positions. From the beginning, the TTIP
drew more opposition than support in Germany, where
opposition grew from 41% in fall 2014 to 59% in spring
2016, suggesting a broad-based, cross-partisan opposi-
tion. In April 2015, as TTIP support had shrunk to 25%
in German public opinion, observers noted a:
Level of resistance [that] has taken Chancellor Angela
Merkel’s government and German industry by sur-
prise, [which] are now scrambling to reverse the tide
and save a deal which proponents say could add $100
billion in annual economic output on both sides of the
Atlantic. (Barkin, 2015)
One year later, the country’s leaders had adopted amore
cautionary approach, recognizing that:
[The] TTIP has run into huge opposition in
Germany….It is a paradox that public opinion in
Europe’s biggest exporter—and one of the greatest
beneficiaries of global trade—is running so strongly
against TTIP. Even senior Germanofficials scratch their
heads at the debate. (Wagstyl, 2016)
These preliminary findings on public opinion suggest
that, breaking with the history of the previous decade, it
was in Germany that opposition to the TTIP was fiercest;
and it was mostly German—not French—opposition,
which forced EU leaders to reconsider their advocacy of
the TTIP.
Even so, the contrast between German and French
publics should not be overstated. French public opin-
ion grew increasingly incandescent over time. In June
2016, 62% of French respondents allegedly opposed the
‘transatlantic trade agreements’ (TTIP and CETA) (Vu de
France, 2016). According to some of policymakers, it
would have taken little for French opposition to the TTIP
to take off like a bonfire. Next, we consider the pattern
of European anti-TTIP activism in greater detail.
3.2. The Contentious Germans
Social mobilization against TTIP in Europe was intense,
broad, and durable. It was also full of national con-
trasts. Social mobilization started at the time of incep-
tion for the TTIP negotiations, in the Spring of 2013.
It maintained steam until the negotiations were sus-
pended in November 2016 (Bouza & Oleart, 2018, p. 88).
Civil society critics of the TTIP coalesced around the
European ‘STOP TTIP!’ campaign, a civil society mobiliza-
tion framed as a European citizenship initiative to invite
the Commission to recommend to the Council to stop
TTIP negotiations. The initiative tested the limits of the
Lisbon European Citizenship Initiative, which was meant
to give EU citizens a voice on EU legislation, not interna-
tional agreements.
The data we have about the ‘STOP TTIP!’ campaign
sheds interesting light on the involvement of French ac-
tivists. On one hand, the campaign, launched in February
2014,met a certain success judging by themap of French
territorial collectivities, which declared themselves ‘hors
TAFTA’ or ‘en vigilance’ (TTIP was also initially called the
Transatlantic Free Trade Agreement [TAFTA], hence the
use of both labels by groups opposed to the proposed
US-EU trade and investment agreement) (Figure 3).
Yet, support in France trailed behind other countries.
While the ‘STOPTTIP!’ campaign recorded 3million signa-
tures in 23 member states, nearly half of the signatures
were collected in Germany alone, making it the new epi-
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Figure 3. TTIP and CETA free zones in Europe. Source: TTIP Free Zones (n.d.). Note: In France, this movement concerned
840 territorial collectivities, of which there are: 14 regions (out of 22 before 2016), and 24 out of the 95 metropolitan
départements.
center of contention. France ranked third (after the UK),
far behind Germany with only one tenth of the overall
number of signatures (Young, 2017).
Germany was the new epicenter of anti-globalization
mobilization (Figure 4). During the critical 2014–2016
period, Germany accounted for 30% of all TTIP-related
actions—far ahead of France, with only 12% of all-TTIP
related actions, but also ahead of (smaller) Austria
and Italy (16% each). As the numbers show, the dif-
ference between Germany and France cannot be ex-
plained by population differences alone. Furthermore,
France was the only country, for which there are data,
where the level of social mobilization in 2016 was
lower than in 2014. This overarching picture of tepid
engagement appears to match anti-TTIP activists’ self-
reporting (Fabry, 2015). During the transnational mobi-
lizations organized on 18 April 2015, out of 700 events
expected to take place, more than 200 occurred in
Germany, with 23,000 marching in protest in Munich
alone, whereas the French ‘Stop-TAFTA’ mentioned only
70 events (Mobilisations, 2016).
Thus, while an important site of anti-TTIP mobiliza-
tion, France no longer seemed to be the epicenter of
European contestation, as in past decades. French ac-
tivists were trailing or even MIA, especially in compar-
ison with their German counterparts. The French were
Figure 4. Trends in the socialmobilization against TTIP in Europe, by country 2014–2016 (number of protest events). Source:
Caiani and Graziano (2018).
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less aware of the TTIP than their German neighbours; to
the extent that they were, they were less opposed to the
TTIP than their German counterparts. Likewise, anti-TTIP
social mobilization was less sustained in France than in
Germany. As Fabry noted in 2015, “One was expecting
opposition to TTIP to come first from France, where pub-
lic opinion is traditionally reticent to trade opening. Yet
by November 2014…Germans had taken the lead in op-
posing TTIP” (Fabry, 2015). Against all expectations, the
perfect storm of the TTIP abated in France. Why was
France MIA?
4. A Political Process Explanation
One possibility is that the TTIP failed to trigger re-
flexive anti-Americanism and street protests because it
was a good deal for the French. After all, the French
economy was weaker than Germany’s, and the TTIP
promised to open new lucrative markets for key sec-
tors of the economy while not threatening vested inter-
ests. Economic studies suggested that the TTIP would
benefit key sectors of the French economy. Potential
‘winners’ of the TTIP were transportation manufactur-
ing sectors (equipment, machinery, and services), chem-
icals and pharmaceuticals, and agriculture (World Trade
Institute, 2016). Perhaps this particular mix of economic
gains explains the more positive reception of the negoti-
ations in France?
We doubt it. Apart from agriculture, the sectors iden-
tified as potential winners from TTIP were never at the
center of popular mobilization in France. As for agricul-
ture, the French had both offensive and defensive in-
terests in the TTIP, and agriculture as a whole was a
contentious topic in the EU–US trade negotiations that
resumed in 2018—with the EU (and the French) pre-
ferring to keep it off the agenda against US insistence
to the contrary. Maybe some agricultural sectors stood
to gain from the TTIP, but these winners were likely
never involved in the earlier anti-globalization mobiliza-
tion waves in France.
Besides, the expected gains were arguably more
than offset in the public discourse by the potential risks
of a downward regulatory convergence in a range of
areas salient for the broader public. As Pascal Lamy,
the former EU trade commissioner and former Director
General of the WTO, put it at the time, these nego-
tiations were “no longer about removing protections;
they [were] about harmonising precautions that prevent
harm to consumers” (Lamy, 2014). Regulatory risks, per-
ceived or real, spanned the environmental (fracking),
health, sanitary and phyto-sanitary (chlorinated chicken,
genetically modified organisms) and geographic indica-
tors (Appellations d’origine contrôlées) areas—not to
mention the controversial ISDS. They were broadly medi-
atized by activists, whichmay explain why public support
for the TTIP in France was mixed with a lingering sense
of distrust and scepticism.
Finally, culture, the focal point of contention in the
late 1990s MAI negotiations, was from the outset an
object of controversy in the French TTIP debate—again.
Thus, while it is doubtful that economic calculi can elu-
cidate why France was MIA, we must explain why simi-
lar issues as those arising in the 1990s failed to produce
similar outcomes in the 2010s. Elaborating on our ex-
planation of French contentiousness in the 1990s, we
advance a political process explanation for the French
MIA puzzle, pinpointing the role of political actors—
both institutional and societal—in defusing reflexive
anti-Americanism.
4.1. Swapping Places—France, Germany, and
Anti-Americanism
France was no longer a beacon of anti-Americanism
when the TTIP negotiations took place. This reflected
both the softening of anti-Americanism in France and
the emergence of German anti-Americanism. Two phe-
nomena explain these changing attitudes towards theUS.
One, the relative structural decline of US power, espe-
cially combined with the parallel rise in power of China
and the 2008 financial crisis, consecrated the US’ fall
from its pedestal, and paradoxically improved the favor-
ability of the US in the eyes of ordinary French (Kim,
Meunier, &Nyiri, 2017;Meunier, 2013). At the turn of the
2010 decade, the sources of worries regarding trade and
investment came more from China than they did from
the US. Second, the election of Barack Obama in 2008
contributed to warming French opinion of the US soar-
ing to a consistent 60% for much of Obama’s two terms.
After the election of Donald Trump in 2016, French views
of the US dipped back to historically low levels in the
1930s (Figure 5).
While French opinion of the US was warming, a re-
verse trend took place in Germany,where the revelations
of widespread American surveillance by the National
Security Agency in 2013 triggered a rise in anti-American
sentiment. The German public, wary of surveillance
for historical reasons, was incensed after learning from
Edward Snowden that the US was routinely monitoring
Chancellor Angela Merkel’s phone. Further revelations
of American spying on Germany in 2014 fuelled German
anger, further damaging public perceptions of the US.
Thus, while views of the US benefitted from the same
‘Obama’ windfall in Germany as in France, by the time of
the TTIP negotiations, they were much less favourable
than the French with a 24% point difference in 2014,
and 23% in 2015 (Figure 5). This relative resurgence of
anti-Americanism in Germany has been highlighted by
several analysts as the principal explanation for the puz-
zling German mobilization on TTIP (Bauer, 2016; Chan
& Crawford, 2017). We take one step further by show-
ing how political entrepreneurship at the governmen-
tal level and at the level of the grassroots underpinned
these changing patterns of anti-American sentiments.
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Figure 5. Favourable views of the US in France and Germany 2002–2018 (percentage responding favorable, all years mea-
sured). Source: Pew Research Center (2019). Note: Full question wording “Please tell me if you have a very favorable,
somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, very unfavorable opinion of the US.”
4.2. Institutional Entrepreneurship: Agenda-Shaping
and Venue-Shaping
Cultural issues had been the unifying focus of French op-
position to the MAI across the political spectrum and a
focal point in anti-American and anti-globalization senti-
ments in France. With the TTIP, cultural goods and ser-
vices came back as a likely bone of contention in the
French debate. However, this time, an important part
of the French government’s strategy was to manage the
looming confrontation by shaping the agenda and the
venue of the negotiations.
By agenda-shaping, we refer to efforts by the French
government to remove the potential lightning rods of
mass contention, first and foremost the issue of audio-
visual goods and services which had such a cross-cutting
character. In its draft mandate of 12 March 2013, the
European Commission had not only provided for the in-
clusion of the audio-visual sector in the negotiations, it
also precluded the use of unanimity decision-making in
the Council, which applies to these issues in virtue of
Article 207 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU.
The French riposte did not wait. In a report of 29 March
2013, the deputies of the French Assemblée Nationale
expressed their outrage, noting that:
It is the first time, in twenty years, that the Commis-
sion does not respect the principle of the cultural ex-
ception by not explicitly excluding the audio-visual
sector from an international trade agreement, a for-
tiori with the US. This is an unprecedented liberal of-
fensive, which requires a response from the national
representatives. (Assemblée Nationale, 2013, p. 2)
The deputies called on the French government to de-
mand that the Commission remove cultural services
from the mandate—and to block the text in the Council
meeting of 14 June 2013, if necessary, by making use
of its veto under unanimity voting. This demand was ini-
tially contested in the Commission, where the College of
Commissioners had voted in favour of the text, but also
in the European Parliament committee on International
Trade, where the chair did not favour the cultural excep-
tion (Roederer-Rynning, 2017). Eventually, the French of-
fensive succeeded to reverse the tide in the Council and
the European Parliament.
In the Council, supported by thirteen other Member
States, as well as many prominent European directors,
the French government led the drive to specifically re-
move audio-visual services from the mandate granted
to the European Commission to negotiate with the US
on behalf of the EU (Ministère de la Culture, 2013).
On 16 May 2013, at the Culture and Education Council,
15 Member States signed a letter calling for the exclu-
sion of culture and audio-visual services from the nego-
tiations. This paved the way for a similar reversal to take
place in the European Parliament. Less than ten days
later, on 23May 2013, the European Parliament adopted
a resolution giving its (not formally binding) support for
opening the TTIP negotiations. Critically, the French se-
cured the scheduling of a separate vote on the ‘cultural
exception,’ in the margin of the vote on the resolution.
Reflecting active lobbying by the French Socialist delega-
tion in the European Parliament, particularly byMember
of the European Parliament (MEP) HenriWeber, the vote
garnered a majority in plenary, although with lower lev-
els of support than the overall resolution (381 in favour,
191 against, 17 abstentions on the cultural exception;
compared to 460 votes in favour, 105 against, and 28 ab-
stentions on the overall TTIP resolution). Thus, a com-
bination of governmental activism and multi-level par-
liamentary mobilization (Roederer-Rynning & Kallestrup,
2017) enabled French delegates to remove audio-visual
goods and services from TTIP negotiations, leaving the
French governmentwith one less traditional point of con-
tention to worry about.
There were still a host of contentious issues on
the agenda, however, one of them being the hotly
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contested ISDS. Compared with ‘the cultural excep-
tion,’ which had a distinctively French resonance, ISDS
was more broadly controversial among the Member
States; therefore, France did not have to wage the bat-
tle against it alone, or even lead the battle. Still, the
French government was active on this issue, especially
the JuniorMinister for International Trade,Matthias Fekl,
pre-empting domestic mobilization by fighting against
‘Brussels’ and demanding that a public consultation be
held on ISDS and negotiations be suspended during the
consultation. In hindsight, we know that the consulta-
tion marked a turning-point not only in the TTIP nego-
tiations (the object of the consultation), but also in the
CETA negotiations, where an alternative to the ISDS pro-
vision had to be found in order to pass ratification. This
was achieved mostly with the help of social movement
activists based in other countries than France. The pub-
lic consultation also acted as a magnet for social mobi-
lization. 80% of replies came from three Member States:
Germany alone accounted for 21.7% of replies, followed
by the UK with 34.8%, and Austria with 22.6%. Among
institutional actors, the Assemblée Nationale was one
of only three national parliaments contributing to the
public consultation, while the other two were the Irish
Oireachtas and the Romanian Senate (Roederer-Rynning
& Kallestrup, 2017, p. 818). Thus, ironically, while de-
manded by France, the consultation served as a platform
for social movement activists from other Member States
to launch a broad-based critique against the ISDS.
Finally, the French government also sought to defuse
massive public contestation by keeping the ratification
process of an eventual TTIP agreement under the control
of national parliaments via the so-called mixed ratifica-
tion route. As with the issue of ‘cultural exception,’ the
French had to battle with the Commission, which favored
the Treaty of Lisbon’s new ‘simple ratification’ procedure,
empowering the European Parliament—not the national
parliaments—to ratify free-trade agreements. The gov-
ernment was allied with the Assemblée Nationale, who
was adamant that “the transatlantic trade and invest-
ment partnership between the EU and the US is a ‘mixed
agreement’ in the sense of EU law, requiring ratification
by all the Member States” (Assemblée Nationale, 2013,
p. 6). But the issue was moot. The mandate directive
contained no clause on the character of the agreement
and its ratification status, and the Commission itself, as
the parliamentary opposition pointed out, advertised the
TTIP on its webpages as a simple agreement (Assemblée
Nationale, 2014, p. 3413). In May 2014, when doubts
resurfaced, the head of the Foreign Affairs committee in
the Assemblée recalled the ‘Korea’ technique (i.e., used
in the EU Free TradeAgreementwith Korea) “consisting in
inserting a cultural clause in the agreement to make sure
it would be ratified as a mixed agreement” (Roederer-
Rynning & Kallestrup, 2017, p. 821). Later, French state
secretary for trade Fleur Pellerin insisted that “this will
be a mixed agreement” (Assemblée Nationale, 2014,
p. 3409) and cited the support of Germany.
In sum, by defusing the ‘cultural exception’ is-
sue, the French government fragmented a re-emerging
broad-based, culture-focused, cross-partisan opposition
to the TTIP, keeping it effectively within narrower par-
tisan bounds. Furthermore, by calling for a public con-
sultation on ISDS, the government sat the negotia-
tions on standby while offering a platform for social
movement entrepreneurs across Europe to rally against
the ISDS. Finally, France acted in coordination with
Germany and its own parliament to keep the mixed
ratification format. The government’s active manage-
ment strategy placed France in a more comfortable po-
sition than other Member States (Xavier-Bender, 2015,
p. 2). This contrasted with the much more precau-
tionary and passive stance adopted by the German
government—overwhelmed by unexpected levels of so-
cietal resistance.
4.3. Social Movement Entrepreneurship: Changes in
ATTAC and the Pivotal Role of the Social Media
The relatively low social mobilization of the French pub-
lic on TTIP could very well reflect the exceptional cir-
cumstances of 2015–2016. The anti-trade and invest-
ment protests in Europe coincided with the most dra-
matic wave of terror attacks perpetrated in France in
recent times. In 2015, 20 people died in Paris as a re-
sult of the Islamic terrorism attacks on the French satire
weekly Charlie Hebdo, followed by a series of terrorist at-
tacks in November, killing 137 people during assaults on
the Bataclan theatre and the Stade de France. In 2016,
87 peoplewere killed by a terrorist truck attack inNice on
Bastille Day. Thus, after January 2015, the collective will
and psyche in Francewere occupied elsewhere. Arguably,
the French were too worried about domestic terrorism
to fuss about TTIP, and perhaps too shocked to partici-
pate in public demonstrations.
Even so, while terror might have overshadowed the
trade agenda, the altermondialiste movement in France
in the 2010s was a pale reflection of itself. No strong
movement entrepreneur emerged in France during the
time of the TTIP negotiations. Though ATTAC was, once
again, at the forefront of the contestation and public mo-
bilization against TTIP, ATTAC France no longer played
the role it once did in the heyday of the movement at
the turn of the 21st century. Mired in scandals and in-
fighting, ATTAC France saw its membership drop by two-
thirds in the first half of the 2000s (Stockemer, 2012).
The organization had also lost its most charismatic mem-
ber. By the time the TTIP negotiations came along, Bové
had become part of the system himself. After an unsuc-
cessful run for the French presidency in 2007, he was
electedMEPunder the banner of theGreen party Europe
Ecologie and was re-elected in 2014. While still involved
in civil disobedience and media-grabbing actions, Bové
wasmostly exerting his policy influence through his work
in the European Parliament. By contrast, German ATTAC
had become quite prominent, with a membership jump
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from 2,000 members in 2001 to 23,000 in 2009, and am-
ple coverage in German media (Stockemer, 2012).
German activists also brought mobilization to new
heights by mastering the art of social media campaign-
ing. The TTIP negotiations generated intense engage-
ment frompublicmedia from the outset. Already in 2013,
communication specialists in the European Commission
were “alarmed” by what a leaked Commission paper
called the “unprecedented level of public and media
interest” (von Nordheim, Boczek, Koppers, & Erdmann,
2018, p. 549). The importance of social media was con-
siderable: tweets containing #ttip tended to be domi-
nated by NGOs and groups of activists. They tended to
be more driven by global anti-TTIP sentiments, and less
connected to national discourses and grievances, in con-
trast to printed news in traditional media (von Nordheim
et al., 2018, p. 562). Over time, “the sentiment of [the
TTIP-related] discussion on Twitter [became] more po-
larized and less balanced” (von Nordheim et al., 2018,
p. 561). Remarkably, there were important national dif-
ferences in this regard, too. Only in Germany and in the
Netherlands did #ttip make it on the top-10 list of trend-
ing hashtags (Nulty, Theocharis, Popa, Parnet, & Benoit,
2016). In Germany alone, #ttip was more popular than
in any other European country, ranking second on the
top-10 list, just behind #piraten. In contrast, in France,
the TTIP negotiations were much less salient in the so-
cial media, and mostly so under the more insular #tafta.
These results confirm claims that “the rise of the Internet
and social media has boosted the public salience of EU
trade policy…forcing transparency, enabling expertise,
shaping public opinion, and facilitating tools for mobiliza-
tion” (Meunier & Czesana, 2019, p. 9).
5. Conclusion: The Double Movement of Contentious
Trade Politics in Europe
In the emerging literature on the politicization of trade
policy, the TTIP stands out by the level of public contes-
tation it generated inWestern democracies. In the estab-
lished comparative European politics literature on collec-
tive action and social movements, France stands out by
the contentiousness of its society. Yet France and its ac-
tivists surprisingly did not play a leading role in the broad
publicmobilization that shook Europe during the TTIP ne-
gotiations. Unlike their German counterparts, ordinary
French long ignored the TTIP and were agnostic about
its potential implications. They did not care enough to
protest massively and durably against it. In 2015 Europe,
the contentious Europeans were German, not French—
why this double movement?
Using a combination of historical and cross-national
comparison, we have put forward a political process
explanation combining anti-Americanism ideas, insti-
tutional entrepreneurship, and social movement en-
trepreneurship. The key to understanding why Germany
and France swapped places in the politicization of trade
in the 2010s is how political entrepreneurship at the gov-
ernmental and societal level shaped anti-Americanism
in these societies. In France, a country that had much
to gain from the TTIP given the sluggishness of its econ-
omy at the time, the government prevented the forma-
tion of a broad-based cross-cutting popular movement
by first removing cultural issues from the agenda through
multi-level institutional lobbying, then fighting for the
mixed ratification of an eventual TTIP agreement—with
Germany, and lastly de facto outsourcing protest against
ISDS to other European countries (Germany), while sus-
pending the negotiations through the European public
consultation organized upon its request. These actions
stand in sharp contrast with the more precautionary and
passive stance adopted by the German government—
overwhelmed by unexpected levels of societal resistance
and a newly-blossoming variety of anti-Americanism.
Consequently, not only was the French government in
a much more comfortable position than other Member
States; it could, and did, hide behind the turbulent
German politics.
At the societal level, an important and overlooked
mutation in the infrastructure of the anti-globalization
social movement took place during these years in
Europe. This is captured by the changing centre of
gravity of ATTAC. ATTAC Germany did for the politi-
cization of trade in the 2010s what ATTAC France
did in the 1990s, although through other means.
While the French precursors’ contribution was to build
an intellectual infrastructure for the anti-globalization
movement—or altermondialiste—the new generation of
German activists brought the anti-globalization move-
ment to new heights by mastering the art of social me-
dia campaigning.
Our study contributes to the scholarship in several
ways. First, it highlights the enduring role of culture in
anti-trademobilization. Culture is a glue binding together
various segments of the citizenry above generational,
partisan, and socio-economic cleavages—it is therefore
a powerful force of mobilization. However, cultural resis-
tance is politically constructed: it can be fuelled and de-
fused by political leaders and movement entrepreneurs.
Second, contemporary Europe displays the coexistence
of an old and new politics of trade. In the old politics
of trade, producers protest the opening of markets and
demand protection. This was traditionally the case of
farmers’ demonstrations in France. In the new politics of
trade, precautionary consumers and citizens protest the
interference into domestic regulation of public norms
and standards arising from diffuse, non-elected interna-
tional bodies. Occasionally, like in France, the old politics
could transcend the narrow bounds of its producer basis
by appealing to culture. The new politics of trade, by con-
trast, is by definitionmass politics, in virtue of its broader
societal basis and proneness to cultural exploitation.
Looking towards the future and the likely resumption
of some more modest trade talks between the EU and
the US, we speculate that the TTIP periodmay have been
a unique moment of opportunity in France unlikely to re-
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peat itself soon. Domestically, the French government is
again on the defensive, with the Gilets Jaunes mobiliza-
tion since late 2018 against the background of the neo-
liberal socio-economic reforms undertaken by Macron,
which could easily morph into opposition against inter-
national trade agreements. Internationally, the protec-
tionist turn and overall nationalist agenda of the Trump
administration, coupled with German power in relative
decline in Europe, mean that the French can no longer
ignore their long-standing mistrust of the US, nor hide
behind Germany, setting the stage for a more open and
assertive confrontation. This will make it more difficult
to carry out a liberalizing transatlantic agenda, unless
the rise of China serves as a glue forcing European and
American interests to converge.
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